Education Technology Software Sector Outlook — September 2026

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INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY › SOFTWARE AND SERVICES › EDUCATION TECHNOLOGY SOFTWARE

Education Technology Software: Whole-Company Buyers Pay More

What buyers of whole companies have been paying, where the listed education technology names are marked, and what separates the premium end from the discount end.

September 2026 · Prepared by NeuraCap AI · Confidential

Market data as of 2026-09-15 · primary valuation basis EV / Revenue (CY2027E)

Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential

Sources & methodology

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   INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY › SOFTWARE AND SERVICES › EDUCATION TECHNOLOGY SOFTWARE

   This is the cover page for the Education Technology Software sector outlook, dated September 15, 2026.

   We open this sector outlook on Education Technology Software with market data as of September 15, 2026, valued primarily on EV/Revenue for CY2027E. The report's finding is straightforward: whole-company buyers pay well above where the listed set trades, and we walk through why over the following sections.

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   INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY › SOFTWARE AND SERVICES › EDUCATION TECHNOLOGY SOFTWARE Education Technology Software: Whole-Company Buyers Pay More What buyers of whole companies have been paying, where the listed education technology names are marked, and what separates the premium end from the discount end. September 2026 · Prepared by NeuraCap AI · Confidential Market data as of 2026-09-15 · primary valuation basis EV / Revenue (CY2027E) Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 1

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   CONTENTS

   What This Report Covers

   This page lists the report's five numbered sections and the appendix.

   We've structured this report so the bottom line comes first: five numbered sections cover the conclusion, the companies, valuation and situations, the deal tape and strategic implications. A reader who stops after section one still leaves with the whole story.

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   CONTENTS What This Report Covers 01 The Bottom Line The Set Is One Segment Deep, and the Deal Tape Prices It Differently 02 The Companies Degree-Partner Services Carries This Set; Assessment Software Is a Single Name 03 Valuation & Situations The Premium End Is Earned on Margin, Not on the Revenue Line 04 The Deal Tape Strategics Are Buying Courseware, Degree-Partner Services and Platform Reach 05 Strategic Implications Revenue Quality Is the Argument That Moves the Mark 06 Appendix Comparables Detail, Methodology, Sources and Assumptions Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 2

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   01 · THE BOTTOM LINE

   Online Program Management Carries This Set, and Whole-Company Buyers Pay Well Above Where It Trades

   This page states the report's bottom line: online program management carries the set, and buyers of whole companies pay well above the listed mark.

   Online program management carries this set, and whole-company buyers pay well above where it trades. Transactions in the covered window were struck at about 3.8x revenue, against a 0.4x median for the listed set on CY2027E EV/Revenue, though the two rest on different bases, so we treat the gap as indicative rather than an exact spread. Chegg (CHGG) marks the premium end of the listed range at 0.7x and Coursera (COUR) the discount end at 0.1x, and what separates them is margin, not the revenue line. So the read for an owner or acquirer is that renewal quality and margin carry the mark in this sector, not top-line growth alone.

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   01 · THE BOTTOM LINE Online Program Management Carries This Set, and Whole-Company Buyers Pay Well Above Where It Trades The full story on one page · figures on EV / Revenue (CY2027E), market data as of 2026-09-15 Source: NeuraCap analytics platform; market data and consensus estimates as of 2026-09-15; company disclosures via SEC EDGAR where linked. Primary valuation basis: EV / Revenue on CY2027E consensus (3 of 5 companies eligible; multiples failing the platform's plausibility gates are excluded, never plotted). Qualitative characterisations are NeuraCap views. Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 3 1 Buyers of Whole Companies Paid Multiples of the Listed Mark Transactions in the covered window were struck at about 3.8x revenue, against 0.4x for the listed set on CY2027E EV / Revenue. Deal pricing rests on trailing financials and the listed figures on forward estimates, so the two are indicative rather than like-for-like; on a common basis the gap narrows. 2 One Segment Holds Four of the Five Names Online program management and degree-partner services accounts for 80% of the set, with 4 of the 5 names. The single learning management and assessment software name carries no forward multiple in the covered data, so the ranking is effectively a read on degree-partner economics. 3 0.7x at the Top, 0.1x at the Bottom Chegg, Inc. (CHGG) marks the premium end at 0.7x on CY2027E and Coursera, Inc. (COUR) the discount end at 0.1x, each on a single name. What separates them in the covered data is margin, not the revenue line. 4 Growth in the Middle of the Set Is 14%, and It Is Not What Is Being Paid For Clearing that growth bar is not what carries the higher mark in this set. Buyers here underwrite renewal on institutional contracts, seat-based licence retention and conversion out of the free learner funnel, rather than a single year's revenue line. 0.4x Sector median EV/Revenue CY2027E consensus · 3 rated of 5 companies 0.7x Premium tier median vs 0.1x discount top quartile (n=1) against bottom quartile (n=1) — the spread the report explains 27 Recorded transactions in this tier told as case studies in the deal section; the full tape is in the appendix

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   SECTION 02

   02

   This is a section divider introducing the five companies covered, split between degree-partner services and a single assessment-software name.

   Degree-partner services carries this set; assessment software is represented by a single name, and the two groups sit on very different renewal economics under the same sector label. We use this page to reset before introducing the five companies and how the market values them.

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   SECTION 02 02 THE COMPANIES Degree-Partner Services Carries This Set; Assessment Software Is a Single Name Two groups with very different renewal economics sit behind the same sector label. 02 of 06 Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 4

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   02 · THE COMPANIES

   Four Names Sell Enrolment; One Sells the Platform Underneath It

   This page introduces the five approved companies, four selling enrolment services and one selling the underlying platform.

   Four of the five approved companies sell enrolment through online program management or degree-partner services, and one sells the platform underneath it. We rate EV/Revenue on CY2027E consensus where an eligible multiple exists, as of September 15, 2026. This concentration means the sector-level valuation read is effectively a read on degree-partner economics. So when we compare multiples next, we're really comparing how the market prices renewal quality within one business model.

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   02 · THE COMPANIES Four Names Sell Enrolment; One Sells the Platform Underneath It 5 approved companies · EV / Revenue (CY2027E) where rated · as of 2026-09-15 Source: NeuraCap analytics platform; market data and consensus estimates as of 2026-09-15; company disclosures via SEC EDGAR where linked. Company descriptions are NeuraCap views grounded in the platform's classification rationale. Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 5 CHGG CHGG Enterprise value $97M EV/Revenue (CY2027E) 0.7x Revenue growth -26% EBITDA margin 22% Chegg, Inc. carries the premium end on the highest covered margin, even with revenue moving the other way. COUR COUR Enterprise value $101M EV/Revenue (CY2027E) 0.1x Revenue growth 22% EBITDA margin 17% Coursera, Inc. holds the discount end of the set: the fastest growth of the rated names, paired with the lower of the two covered margins. DAO DAO Enterprise value $3.1B EV/Revenue (CY2027E) 0.4x Revenue growth 14% EBITDA margin n/a Sits in the middle of the rated group on the forward lens, with growth at the centre of the set and no covered margin. DUOL DUOL Enterprise value n/a EV/Revenue (CY2027E) n/a Revenue growth n/a EBITDA margin n/a The one name outside degree-partner services, carried in the set without a forward multiple in the covered data. LOPE LOPE Enterprise value n/a EV/Revenue (CY2027E) n/a Revenue growth n/a EBITDA margin n/a A degree-partner services name included in the map but outside the rated group on this lens.

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   SECTION 03

   03

   This is a section divider introducing public market valuation, noting that the premium end is earned on margin rather than revenue growth.

   The premium end of this set is earned on margin, not on the revenue line, and a forward CY2027E basis already credits expected growth, which is what makes the ranking informative. The next pages walk through the drivers and the situation map.

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   SECTION 03 03 VALUATION & SITUATIONS The Premium End Is Earned on Margin, Not on the Revenue Line A forward CY2027E basis already credits forecast growth, which makes the ranking informative. 03 of 06 Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 6

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   03 · PUBLIC MARKET VALUATION

   The Market Is Paying for Delivered Margin, Not for the Faster Revenue Line

   This page ranks the approved companies on CY2027E EV/Revenue against the 0.4x median of the rated set.

   We rank every approved company on EV/Revenue for CY2027E, marking the three of five names with an eligible multiple against a 0.4x median for the rated set; the two without an eligible multiple are shown as n/a rather than omitted. Chegg (CHGG) sits at the top of the rated range at 0.7x and Coursera (COUR) at the bottom at 0.1x. The market is pricing delivered margin here, not the faster revenue line. So an owner should read this ranking as a margin scorecard first, growth second.

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   03 · PUBLIC MARKET VALUATION The Market Is Paying for Delivered Margin, Not for the Faster Revenue Line EV / Revenue (CY2027E) · every approved company shown; names without an eligible multiple are marked n/a · as of 2026-09-15 Source: NeuraCap analytics platform; market data and consensus estimates as of 2026-09-15; company disclosures via SEC EDGAR where linked. Primary valuation basis: EV / Revenue on CY2027E consensus (3 of 5 companies eligible; multiples failing the platform's plausibility gates are excluded, never plotted). A ranked multiple chart is not drawn below four rated names; the readout shows each company against the 0.4x median of the rated set. Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 7 Company Ticker EV EV/Revenue (CY2027E) Rev growth EBITDA margin What sets the price CHGG CHGG $97M 0.7x -26% 22% Chegg, Inc. carries the premium end on the highest covered margin, even with revenue moving the other way. COUR COUR $101M 0.1x 22% 17% Coursera, Inc. holds the discount end of the set: the fastest growth of the rated names, paired with the lower of the two covered margins. DAO DAO $3.1B 0.4x 14% n/a Sits in the middle of the rated group on the forward lens, with growth at the centre of the set and no covered margin. DUOL DUOL n/a n/a n/a n/a The one name outside degree-partner services, carried in the set without a forward multiple in the covered data. LOPE LOPE n/a n/a n/a n/a A degree-partner services name included in the map but outside the rated group on this lens. 3.8x Deal-tape median EV/LTM revenue LTM at announcement · recorded transactions in this tier 27 Recorded transactions the deal tape in the next section prices what the public tape cannot $1.5B Largest recorded deal (Dec-2023) John Wiley & Sons Inc. / University Services

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   03 · VALUATION DRIVERS

   What the Market Rewards

   This page examines what factors correlate with the higher market multiples in the rated set.

   We test what the rated names' multiples correlate with, using EV/Revenue on CY2027E as the basis, as of September 15, 2026. The readings here are our own view of association in the supplied data, not a claim of causation. So this driver analysis frames the situation map that follows rather than standing as a rule on its own.

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   03 · VALUATION DRIVERS What the Market Rewards EV / Revenue (CY2027E) · as of 2026-09-15 Source: NeuraCap analytics platform; market data and consensus estimates as of 2026-09-15; company disclosures via SEC EDGAR where linked. Cohort medians on rated names with the required estimates (faster n=0; slower n=0). Driver readings are NeuraCap views on the supplied data — association, not causation. Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 8 Growth the Market Believes In Growth coverage is limited in this universe. Margin Quality Profitability differences compound the growth split rather than replacing it. Business Mix Segment medians differ across Online program management and degree-partner services, Learning management and assessment software — mix, not the sector label, sets the multiple.

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   03 · SITUATION MAP

   Two Names, Two Corners: The Set Has No Example of a Mark Running Ahead of Margin

   This page maps rated companies by valuation versus the sector median and margin versus the covered median.

   We cut the rated names on EV/Revenue against the 0.4x sector median and on margin against the covered median, and this comparison set has no example of a mark running ahead of margin. One rated name without the second measure is left off the map. These are observations on where each company sits, not a recommendation to buy or sell. So the map is the starting point for the questions the next page puts to an owner.

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   03 · SITUATION MAP Two Names, Two Corners: The Set Has No Example of a Mark Running Ahead of Margin Cut on EV / Revenue vs the sector median (0.4x) (rows) and EBITDA margin vs the covered median (19%) (columns) · 1 rated names without the second measure are not mapped · observations, not recommendations Source: NeuraCap analytics platform; market data and consensus estimates as of 2026-09-15; company disclosures via SEC EDGAR where linked. Situation boundaries are the cohort's own medians (Directional, NeuraCap view). This page characterises situations; it does not recommend buying or selling any security. Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 9 Paid for Profitable Delivery Above-median multiple · above-median EBITDA margin 1 names CHGG Chegg, Inc. (CHGG) is the single name above the middle on both the CY2027E mark and the EBITDA margin. It shows the market attaching its premium to delivered profitability even where the revenue line is going the other way. Marked up Ahead of Margin Above-median multiple · below-median EBITDA margin 0 names No rated names sit in this cell as of the analysis date. Profitable but Marked Down Below-median multiple · above-median EBITDA margin 0 names No rated names sit in this cell as of the analysis date. Marked Down on Both Readings Below-median multiple · below-median EBITDA margin 1 names COUR Coursera, Inc. (COUR) sits below the middle on both readings, despite growing faster than the middle of the set. The read on this two-name base is that revenue quality and margin, not the growth line, are what the market is weighting here.

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    03 · THE AGENDA

    Three Questions This Comparison Set Puts to an Owner

    This page poses three questions the comparison set raises for an owner or acquirer.

    We frame the questions this comparison set puts to an owner or acquirer, grounded in the cohort data shown on the prior pages. This is our directional view, not investment advice. So we use it to set up the deal-tape and strategic-implications sections that follow.

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    03 · THE AGENDA Three Questions This Comparison Set Puts to an Owner NeuraCap view · framed as the questions an owner or acquirer should resolve · observations, not recommendations Source: NeuraCap analytics platform; market data and consensus estimates as of 2026-09-15; company disclosures via SEC EDGAR where linked. All content on this page is Directional — NeuraCap advisory judgment grounded in the cohort data shown earlier. It does not constitute investment advice. Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 10 Which Revenue in the Mix Earns the Higher Mark? The set marks contracted institutional revenue above episodic course revenue. Separating multi-year site licences and degree-partner contracts from one-off course and exam-cycle income shows which part of the business is carrying the valuation and where the next sales dollar should go. What changes the answer: Institutional renewal rates holding through a full appropriation and budget cycle. Build the Item Bank and Credentials, or Buy Them? Ownership of assessment content, item banks and credentials is what makes revenue repeat in this sector, and the tape shows strategics buying that ownership rather than assembling it. The choice is whether internal build reaches procurement-grade efficacy evidence faster than an acquisition would. What changes the answer: A courseware or assessment asset available near where the listed set is marked. Is Growth Funded by Margin or by Paid Marketing? Heavy reliance on paid performance marketing is a known detractor in how these assets are underwritten, because growth stops when spend stops. Tracking payback on learner acquisition alongside paid conversion and completion shows whether the funnel is compounding or renting demand. What changes the answer: Acquisition payback lengthening while paid conversion from the free funnel flattens.

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    SECTION 04

    04

    This is a section divider introducing the deal tape, noting strategics are buying courseware, degree-partner services and platform reach.

    Strategics have been buying courseware, degree-partner services and platform reach: nine transactions sit in the covered window, three of them with a disclosed enterprise value and multiple. The next pages walk through the case studies and the full tape.

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    SECTION 04 04 THE DEAL TAPE Strategics Are Buying Courseware, Degree-Partner Services and Platform Reach Nine transactions in the covered window, three of them with a disclosed enterprise value and multiple. 04 of 06 Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 11

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    04 · DEAL CASE STUDIES

    The Tape Favours Strategic Buyers Widening Their Footprint in Learning

    This page walks through three transactions from the deal tape as case studies.

    We walk through three of the twenty-seven recorded transactions as case studies, chosen because each discloses a value and a multiple; the complete tape sits in the appendix. These deal multiples are calculated on LTM financials at announcement, so we don't treat them as directly comparable to the CY2027E public basis, and we're not claiming a spread. Every disclosed transaction in this window pairs a strategic buyer with contracted relationships, campus footprint or catalogue breadth. So the tape favours strategic buyers widening their footprint in learning, which is the through-line for the case studies here.

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    04 · DEAL CASE STUDIES The Tape Favours Strategic Buyers Widening Their Footprint in Learning 3 of 27 recorded transactions, told as case studies · multiples on LTM financials at announcement where disclosed · the complete tape is in the appendix · as of 2026-09-15 Source: NeuraCap analytics platform; market data and consensus estimates as of 2026-09-15; company disclosures via SEC EDGAR where linked. 32 tape record(s) carry data-quality flags (deal value unit unresolved; divestiture roles reassigned; parent financials detached); figures are shown as recorded in the filing. 26 recorded transactions with neither a disclosed value nor a multiple are omitted from the tape and the case studies (kept in the companion workbook). Deal multiples are LTM at announcement (Definitive, from filings); they are not directly comparable to the CY2027E public basis and no spread is claimed. "Why the deal happened" is a NeuraCap read of the recorded evidence. Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 12 Dec-2025 $469M Coursera, Inc. acquires Udemy, Inc. EV / LTM revenue 0.6x EV / LTM EBITDA 6.6x WHY THE DEAL HAPPENED The transaction suggests a buyer choosing catalogue breadth and a wider credential and certificate stack over building the same content itself. Both parties sell to consumers and to enterprises, so the announced structure points to overlapping funnels being run once rather than twice. HOW THE TARGET WAS VALUED The deal carries $469M of enterprise value, struck at 0.6x revenue and 6.6x EBITDA. That revenue mark sits close to the premium end of the listed set and well below the earnings multiples paid for degree-partner services assets on the same tape. Aug-2024 $867M Immersion Corporation Immersion Corporation reaches into the campus with Barnes & Noble Education, Inc. EV / LTM revenue 0.6x EV / LTM EBITDA n/a WHY THE DEAL HAPPENED The announced deal points to a buyer paying for installed campus relationships and course material distribution rather than for a software growth curve. Contracted campus presence is difficult to rebuild, which is the asset the structure appears to be reaching for. HOW THE TARGET WAS VALUED The transaction is recorded at $867M of enterprise value and 0.6x revenue. That is a revenue-basis mark for a services-heavy business, which is why the earnings read matters more here than the top line. Dec-2023 $1.5B John Wiley & Sons Inc. John Wiley & Sons Inc. pays up for University Services and the degree-partner stream EV / LTM revenue 3.8x EV / LTM EBITDA 34.9x WHY THE DEAL HAPPENED The transaction suggests a publisher buying its way deeper into online program management, where revenue follows enrolment starts under multi-year university agreements. Accreditation standing and institutional relationships are the parts of that business a buyer cannot assemble quickly. HOW THE TARGET WAS VALUED Enterprise value of $1.5B translates to about 3.8x revenue and 34.9x EBITDA. Those are the highest marks on this tape and sit far above where the listed set trades on CY2027E, though the deal basis is trailing and the listed basis forward.

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    SECTION 05

    05

    This is a section divider introducing strategic implications tied to revenue quality.

    Revenue quality is the argument that moves the mark in this sector: what the comparison set implies for mix, pricing and where the next dollar of spend goes. The following page sets out the strategic implications for owners, acquirers and capital allocation.

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    SECTION 05 05 STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS Revenue Quality Is the Argument That Moves the Mark What the comparison set implies for mix, pricing and where the next dollar of spend goes. 05 of 06 Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 13

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    05 · STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

    What This Set Implies for How a Business Is Positioned

    This page sets out what the comparison set implies for owners, acquirers and capital allocation.

    We set out what this comparison set implies for owners, strategic acquirers and capital allocation over the next twelve months. For owners, margin and renewal quality on institutional contracts carry more weight than another push on revenue growth. For acquirers, the tape rewards buying accreditation standing, item banks and embedded workflow that cannot be rebuilt quickly. So we frame this page as the questions this data puts on the table, not as a recommendation.

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    05 · STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS What This Set Implies for How a Business Is Positioned NeuraCap view · the questions this data puts on the table for the next twelve months Source: NeuraCap analytics platform; market data and consensus estimates as of 2026-09-15; company disclosures via SEC EDGAR where linked. This page is Directional — NeuraCap views drawn from the analysis in this report. Observations, not recommendations. Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 14 FOR OWNERS Margin, Not the Revenue Line, Is What This Set Is Being Paid For In the covered data the higher mark sits with the higher margin even where revenue is falling. That points the operating agenda at pricing discipline, renewal rates on institutional contracts and cost of delivery, ahead of another push on top-line growth funded by campaign spend. FOR STRATEGIC ACQUIRERS The Tape Rewards Buying What Cannot Be Rebuilt Quickly Every disclosed transaction in the window pairs a strategic buyer with contracted relationships: campus footprint, university agreements or catalogue breadth. Accreditation standing, item banks and embedded workflow are the parts of a target that hold their value after the deal closes. FOR CAPITAL ALLOCATION Spend Against the Academic Calendar, Not the Quarter Bookings and cash cluster around term starts, so a single quarter read alone will mislead on both growth and margin. Sizing product, content and sales investment against renewal windows and enrolment starts keeps the margin story intact through the slower part of the year.

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    SECTION 06

    06

    This is a section divider introducing the appendix: the full comparables universe, methodology and sources.

    The appendix carries the full comparables universe, the deal tape, the methodology and where every underlying disclosure lives. Use it to trace any figure in the body of this report back to its source.

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    SECTION 06 06 APPENDIX The Full Universe, Methodology and Sources Comparables detail behind every figure in the body, the valuation basis, and where each underlying disclosure lives. 06 of 06 Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 15

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    06 · PUBLIC COMPARABLES (1 OF 1)

    Public Comparables on EV / Revenue (CY2027E), Grouped by Valuation Tier

    This appendix page lists all approved public comparables on CY2027E EV/Revenue, grouped by valuation tier.

    We list every approved company on EV/Revenue for CY2027E, shading names above the 0.4x sector median in teal and below in amber; three names are rated and two are not. Tickers link to the underlying source, and the companion workbook carries the complete field set. So this page is the reference table behind every valuation chart earlier in the report.

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    06 · PUBLIC COMPARABLES (1 OF 1) Public Comparables on EV / Revenue (CY2027E), Grouped by Valuation Tier Teal shading marks a EV/Revenue above the sector median (0.4x); amber marks below · 3 rated companies; 2 not rated (no eligible EV/Revenue) · tickers link to the underlying source · as of 2026-09-15 Source: NeuraCap analytics platform; market data and consensus estimates as of 2026-09-15; company disclosures via SEC EDGAR where linked. All 3 rated rows are in this appendix and in the companion workbook, which carries the complete field set. Names without an eligible multiple are listed in the companion workbook. Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 16 Company Ticker Segment EV EV/Revenue (CY2027E) Rev growth EBITDA margin Rule of 40 PREMIUM — ≥0.5x · median 0.7x · 1 companies CHGG CHGG Online program management and degree-partner services $97M 0.7x -26% 22% -4 CORE — 0.2x–0.5x · median 0.4x · 1 companies DAO DAO Online program management and degree-partner services $3.1B 0.4x 14% n/a n/a DISCOUNT — <0.2x · median 0.1x · 1 companies COUR COUR Online program management and degree-partner services $101M 0.1x 22% 17% 39

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    06 · PRECEDENT TRANSACTIONS (1 OF 2)

    The Full Deal Tape, Newest First

    This appendix page begins the full precedent-transactions tape, newest first.

    This page opens the full deal tape of twenty-seven recorded transactions, newest first, with multiples calculated on LTM financials at announcement where disclosed. Deal values link back to the underlying filing, and eighteen of the twenty-seven transactions appear across these two pages, with the remainder in the companion workbook. So this is the primary source list behind the deal-tape conclusions drawn earlier in the report.

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    06 · PRECEDENT TRANSACTIONS (1 OF 2) The Full Deal Tape, Newest First 27 recorded transactions in this tier · multiples on LTM financials at announcement where disclosed · deal values link to the underlying filing · as of 2026-09-15 Source: NeuraCap analytics platform; market data and consensus estimates as of 2026-09-15; company disclosures via SEC EDGAR where linked. 32 tape record(s) carry data-quality flags (deal value unit unresolved; divestiture roles reassigned; parent financials detached); figures are shown as recorded in the filing. 26 recorded transactions with neither a disclosed value nor a multiple are omitted from the tape and the case studies (kept in the companion workbook). Deal multiples are LTM at announcement (Definitive, from filings); they are not directly comparable to the CY2027E public basis and no spread is claimed. 18 of 27 transactions shown; the rest are in the companion workbook. Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 17 Date Transaction EV EV/LTM Rev EV/LTM EBITDA Why it matters Dec-2025 Coursera, Inc. → Udemy, Inc. $469M 0.6x 6.6x Coursera, Inc. (COUR) announced the acquisition of Udemy, Inc. in Dec-2025 at $469M of enterprise value. The deal puts two large course marketplaces under one roof and is the clearest read in the window on what a consumer-and-enterprise learning catalogue is worth. Nov-2025 Cogna Educação S.A. → Vasta Platform Limited $80M n/a n/a Cogna Educação S.A. announced the acquisition of Vasta Platform Limited in Nov-2025. No multiple sits on the tape for this transaction, but the pairing points to school-system courseware and adoption cycles being consolidated under a single national operator. Oct-2025 Telefônica Brasil S.A. → Ada Tecnologia e Educação S.A. $3M n/a n/a Telefônica Brasil S.A. announced the purchase of Ada Tecnologia e Educação S.A. in Oct-2025. No multiple is carried on the tape; the logic on the face of it is distribution, putting a digital skills offering in front of an existing subscriber base. Aug-2024 Immersion Corporation → Barnes & Noble Education, Inc. $867M 0.6x n/a Immersion Corporation announced the acquisition of Barnes & Noble Education, Inc. in Aug-2024 at $867M of enterprise value. The target's value sits in contracted campus relationships and course material distribution rather than in a software growth curve. Jul-2024 Turkcell İletişim Hizmetleri A.Ş. → Dijital Eğitim Teknolojileri A.Ş. $1M n/a n/a Turkcell İletişim Hizmetleri A.Ş. announced the acquisition of Dijital Eğitim Teknolojileri A.Ş. in Jul-2024. No multiple is carried on the tape; the shape matches other carrier moves in the window, where an operator adds learning content to a consumer bundle. Jul-2024 Mr. Yuhui Dong → Target Company $11M n/a n/a Mr. Yuhui Dong announced a purchase in Jul-2024 of a target carried without a name in the record. It is a small transaction with no multiple on the tape and reads as an ownership change rather than a strategic combination. Jan-2024 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. → Education Services Upper Holdings Corp. $93M n/a n/a John Wiley & Sons, Inc. announced the acquisition of Education Services Upper Holdings Corp. in Jan-2024. No multiple sits on the tape, and the direction matches the buyer's wider move into university-facing services. Dec-2023 John Wiley & Sons Inc. → University Services $1.5B 3.8x 34.9x John Wiley & Sons Inc. announced the acquisition of University Services in Dec-2023 at $1.5B of enterprise value. It is the anchor transaction on this tape and the one that sets the benchmark for degree-partner services assets. Nov-2023 Docebo Inc. → PeerBoard (Circles Collective Inc.) and Edugo AI HK Limited $3M n/a n/a Docebo Inc. announced the purchase of PeerBoard (Circles Collective Inc.) and Edugo AI HK Limited in Nov-2023. No multiple is carried on the tape; the size and shape point to adding community and AI features to a learning platform rather than buying revenue.

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    06 · PRECEDENT TRANSACTIONS (2 OF 2)

    The Full Deal Tape, Newest First

    This appendix page continues the full precedent-transactions tape, newest first.

    This page continues the full deal tape of twenty-seven recorded transactions, newest first, on the same LTM-at-announcement basis. Twenty-six transactions with neither a disclosed value nor a multiple are kept in the companion workbook rather than shown here. So together these two pages give a client the complete, sourced record behind the tape's conclusions.

    Everything on this page

    06 · PRECEDENT TRANSACTIONS (2 OF 2) The Full Deal Tape, Newest First 27 recorded transactions in this tier · multiples on LTM financials at announcement where disclosed · deal values link to the underlying filing · as of 2026-09-15 Source: NeuraCap analytics platform; market data and consensus estimates as of 2026-09-15; company disclosures via SEC EDGAR where linked. 32 tape record(s) carry data-quality flags (deal value unit unresolved; divestiture roles reassigned; parent financials detached); figures are shown as recorded in the filing. 26 recorded transactions with neither a disclosed value nor a multiple are omitted from the tape and the case studies (kept in the companion workbook). Deal multiples are LTM at announcement (Definitive, from filings); they are not directly comparable to the CY2027E public basis and no spread is claimed. 18 of 27 transactions shown; the rest are in the companion workbook. Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 18 Date Transaction EV EV/LTM Rev EV/LTM EBITDA Why it matters May-2023 Undisclosed buyer → Student Brands, LLC $20M n/a n/a Value shown as recorded in the filing; deal value unit unresolved, divestiture roles reassigned, status defaulted announced. Feb-2023 HealthStream, Inc. → Electronic Education Documentation System, LLC $7M n/a n/a Value shown as recorded in the filing; deal value unit unresolved, status defaulted announced. Oct-2022 Onfolio Holdings Inc. → BCP Media, Inc. $4M n/a 3.2x Value shown as recorded in the filing; deal value unit unresolved, status defaulted announced. Aug-2022 Novus Holdings Limited → South African K12, TVET and local Higher Education Courseware business $86M n/a n/a Value shown as recorded in the filing; deal value unit unresolved, status defaulted announced. Jan-2022 Pearson plc → Credly $200M 15.0x n/a Value shown as recorded in the filing; deal value unit unresolved. Jan-2022 Blackbaud, Inc. → EverFi, Inc. $750M n/a n/a Value shown as recorded in the filing; deal value unit unresolved, status defaulted announced. Nov-2021 Chegg, Inc. → Busuu Online S.L. $436M 9.7x n/a Value shown as recorded in the filing; deal value unit unresolved, status defaulted announced. Apr-2021 Franklin Covey Co. → Strive Talent, Inc. $20M n/a n/a Value shown as recorded in the filing; deal value unit unresolved. Mar-2021 Vista Equity Partners Management, LLC → Pluralsight, Inc. n/a 9.8x n/a

19. 19
    06 · METHODOLOGY

    Sources, Assumptions and Data Quality

    This page documents the report's sources, assumptions and data-quality treatment.

    This page sets out the sources, assumptions and data-quality treatment behind every figure in the report, including what was excluded and why. So a client can trace any number in this deck back to its underlying disclosure through this page.

    Everything on this page

    06 · METHODOLOGY Sources, Assumptions and Data Quality How this report was built, what was excluded, and where every underlying disclosure lives · as of 2026-09-15 Typeface note: NeuraCap brand face is Kallisto Medium; this build renders in a standard sans (Arial) and should be reviewed in the brand face before external distribution. Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential 19 VALUATION BASIS Primary valuation basis: EV / Revenue on CY2027E consensus (3 of 5 companies eligible; multiples failing the platform's plausibility gates are excluded, never plotted). EV / Revenue on CY2027E is the lead convention: it is the sector-appropriate prior for Education Technology Software and it clears the coverage gate with 5 of 5 companies (100%). EV / EBITDA, P / E are carried as a cross-check. DATA QUALITY & EXCLUSIONS 7 records were excluded or quarantined by the platform's validation gates (unit errors, implausible ratios, ineligible securities and classification failures); the full ledger ships in the companion tables and never feeds a statistic in this report. DEFINITIVE VS DIRECTIONAL Definitive content is disclosed or consensus data passed through stated arithmetic. Directional content — tier boundaries, situation cuts, "why it matters" commentary, the agenda pages — is NeuraCap analyst judgment and is labeled as such where it appears. WHAT THIS REPORT IS NOT This report characterises a sector. It does not recommend buying, selling or holding any security, and no statement in it should be read as investment advice or a price target. WHERE THE DATA LIVES 282 registered source documents stand behind the figures in this report. Metric hyperlinks throughout the deck open the specific filing or data record; by publisher: sec.gov (281) · home.treasury.gov (1). The companion workbook beside this deck carries the complete source index.

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    Renewal Quality and Margin, Not the Growth Line, Are What This Market Is Marking.

    This is the closing page, stating that renewal quality and margin are what this market is marking.

    Renewal quality and margin, not the growth line, are what this market is marking. The companion tables beside this report carry the full universe, the exclusion ledger and the complete source index for any figure a client wants to trace.

    Everything on this page

    Renewal Quality and Margin, Not the Growth Line, Are What This Market Is Marking. NeuraCap AI — Education Technology Software Coverage September 2026 · Prepared by NeuraCap AI · Confidential Education Technology Software Coverage | September 2026 | Confidential Sources & methodology 20

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